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1776 AND 1892.

BY F. M. HOLLAND.

OUR forefathers were right in declaring themselves independent of a king who was "cutting off our trade with all parts of the world," and "imposing taxes on us without our consent." Duties on tea had already called out a vigorous protest in Boston harbor; and there was just indignation against laws meant to suppress our iron-works and woolen mills in order to protect British manufacturers. Glorious resistance to unconstitutional taxation had already been made by Hampden and Cromwell, as well as by the barons who won Magna Charta. These were not merely questions of money; for he is not a man but a slave, who has no wish to defend his rights. It is not so much to save money as manhood, that we ought to resist all attempts to cut off our trade, and impose taxes on us without our consent. How far our people were from consenting to the tariff of 1890 may be judged from the fact that the next election sent three times as many of its enemies as its friends to Congress. States which had hitherto been staunchly Republican, like Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Wisconsin, were swept away by that outburst of righteous indignation.

The tribute most sternly to be opposed is that which we are forced by the government to pay to its favorites in the form of high prices. In making the duty on various manufactures of steel and iron high enough to prevent importation, all the money paid by purchasers, above what these articles would cost if there were free trade therein, is put into the coffers of Mr. Carnegie and other wealthy owners of mines and factories. We import about one-fourth part of the wools and woolens consumed here; and the result is that in order to put about \$35,000,000 a year into our national treasury, the tariff brings in about \$110,000,000 to owners of factories and flocks. The constitutionality of these exactions is by no means evident; and their injustice is plain enough. No one who remembers what has reduced the price of sugar can deny that duties raise prices. They would not protect any one if they did not.

It often happens, however, that the products of

one man's industry are thus made too expensive for other men, who must have them in order to labor profitably. The business of smelting silver at Chicago has been seriously interfered with by a tax on Mexican ores, which is defended by the Republican national platform against the Democratic Congress. While our present tariff was under consideration, nearly six-hundred owners and managers of iron works in New England petitioned for free coal, coke, and iron ore, with pig iron and similar supplies at reduced rates. The request was denied; and the result is that the Cambridge Rolling Mills have been obliged to close; most of the nail factories in Massachusetts have been driven out of the business, and the manufacture in that commonwealth of steel rails, highly successful before 1890, has been made impossible. Another memorial, which was presented in vain to Congress two years ago, was from manufacturers of cloth, who still find their industry checked by duties which make wool dear here and cheap in Europe, so as to "help the foreigner to send to this country vast quantities of woolen goods that, with free wool and moderate duties on the goods, might be manufactured at home." Almost all the carpet wool, for instance, which is used here has to be imported; and the price is kept so high by the duty as to make it impossible for our factories to send carpets abroad. Every nation, except ours, which has any manufacturers, lets them get wool and other raw materials free of duty, and thus enables them to undersell Americans. These American citizens are excluded by our own tariff from every foreign market, while sales at home are much diminished. Every one of our manufacturers finds himself restricted by the high price of articles made by other manufacturers; and the duties on paint, glass, lumber, tools, cotton-ties, and twine bear heavily upon farmers, planters, mechanics, and other laborers who get little or no protection from the tariff. The worst case of interference with honest industry of American citizens is in one of those branches most essential to the nation's safety and honor. Nearly three-fourths of the trade across the ocean, to and from our ports, was under our own flag in 1858. Ever since the low tariff, then in force, has been given up, there has been a

steady decline. Only one-fourth of our imports and exports were carried under the stars and stripes in 1878; and the proportion has now shrunk to one-seventh. Our merchants suffer under the double burden of navigation laws, forbidding the purchase of ships built abroad, and of tariff duties which make it too expensive to build ships and steamers here, except for use along the coast. Thus Americans are prevented from building or owning ships.

Many more cases might be mentioned of interference with individual liberty; but the most important fact is that these are not accidents. They are the necessary results of protection tariffs in the United States. The only way to protect an American in the manufacture of any article is to forbid all other Americans to buy that article at lower rates than he chooses to charge. The foreign manufacturers cannot be reached except by interfering with every American who wishes to buy their goods; and these Americans are injured unavoidably. The foreigner of whom they wish to buy may find a customer elsewhere; but they must choose between paying the increased price and going without the article. Every industry in which that article is used is depressed by its rising in price. Thus to protect one American industry, other American industries must be proportionately depressed. One industry is raised by treading others of our industries down. One American is assisted to make money by hindering other Americans from doing so. The more numerous the protected industries, the more numerous must be the crippled ones.

It is easy for a monarchy to protect a few necessary branches of industry, like ship-building, by keeping up all the duties which help them, and none which hinder them, and thus to throw only slight burdens on the great mass of the people. This kind of protection is impossible in a republic, for very few men will vote for a tariff which does not at least profess to protect their own special industry. A leading protectionist, General Draper, has stated as follows the reason that wool and pig iron are protected, in spite of the injury thus inflicted on manufacturers: "The wool raiser and the pig iron producer, deprived of their occupations, would join the army of free traders; and protection to manufacturers and mechanics would be unlikely to continue." It is hard to see where the protection to the mechanic comes in; but the reason the farmer gets protection on wool and grain, as well as on milk, eggs, green peas, and other articles too perishable to be imported in large quantities, is to buy his vote for a tariff whose main advantage goes to the miners and manufacturers. Four years ago, the Republican League of the United States issued a confidential circular, complaining that too little money was given, for the expenses of this party in president-

ial campaigns, by "the manufacturers of the United States who are most benefited by our tariff laws." It is further stated that these men "reap the fruits of the tariff policy" and that this is especially true of "the manufacturers of Pennsylvania who are more highly protected than anybody else, and who make large fortunes every year when times are prosperous." The manufacturers acknowledged the truth of the circular by contributing with a liberality which gave victory to the Republican party; whose gratitude took the form of a rise of duties in the interest of the class already "most benefited." In accepting his nomination, this year, Mr. Cleveland has denounced our tariff laws as "inequitable and unfair." If they were not, they would protect nobody. A perfectly equitable tariff would raise all prices, including wages, in exactly the same proportion; but this would give no industry any advantage over the rest. Our tariff is avowedly for the advantage of manufacturers; and they get most of its real benefits; but the rest of our people get at best only enough benefit to buy their votes by closing their eyes to the fact that they lose more than they gain. Thus the burden of high prices is made much heavier than it would be if the tariff were limited to the protection of the industries now most benefited, with no money wasted on a false show of encouraging industries which are really depressed.

It must also be remembered that the tariff sometimes defeats itself by stimulating the most highly favored interests to such excessive production as to glut the market. This was the case some twenty years ago, when half the furnaces which had been making pig iron were closed, and the men thrown out of work. The steel business seems now to be suffering in much the same way. The manufacturers have been making so much money, that suspension of business means nothing worse to them than a trip to Europe; but the workman may have to travel in much less pleasant fashion. His great need is steady employment; and his chances of it are much diminished by his employer's confinement to the home market. This confinement is due to the dearth of raw materials rather than to that of labor. I hope to prove in another article that wages depend upon the efficiency of the laborer, as may be seen from the fact that he earns more in free-trade England than in any protectionist country in Europe. We, too, need to sell goods in foreign markets; but we are not helped to do it by a tariff which was intended by its author to check importation. This cannot be done without checking exportation also. Our neighbors prefer to buy where they can sell something in return. Canada and Mexico, for instance, could afford to take more of our goods, if we were allowed to get their ores and lumber free of duty. These are the countries with which we

most need reciprocity; but that word merely means a protectionist scheme for letting the blessings of commerce flow in drop by drop, according to the interest of a few pampered favorites, without regard to the right of all our people to trade freely with all mankind.

Thus we are fighting like the men of 1776, against "cutting off our trade with all parts of the world," and imposing unjust taxes upon us; for every tax which is unequal is unjust. This time the war for freedom cannot be bloody, and need not be long; but it will go on until liberty is won.

EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS.

BY THOS. C. LAWS.

THERE is still very prevalent amongst us a belief that morality is the prerogative of mankind, and that "true morality" is to be found only among those human beings whom the accident of birth has made denizens of the same geographical district or political territory, or whose religious, philosophical, and political views, and their social position, are more or less coincident with our own. It is almost universally believed that morality is a something either directly implanted in the human breast by divine agency, or in some other way possessed of objectivity. Sometimes, indeed, we hear spoken of, not morality itself, but the "moral sentiment," as having an independent existence. But this does not in any way mend matters. A sentiment is but a combination of emotions, in themselves simple or compound as the case may be. Now, emotions as well as ideas have a purely subjective existence, although indirectly through the chain of events which has called them into being, their ultimate origin must have been objective. If one show fear at the sight of a lion, that emotion is only partially called forth by the objective being. Had we never previously seen or heard of a lion it is probable that we should not have exhibited fear. It has been frequently remarked that birds upon oceanic islands, when first visited by man, have shown no fear, but have allowed themselves to be taken or killed with impunity. On the other hand, the sense of fear is discriminatingly shown by the birds of our fields, who instantly distinguish between a sheep or a cow and a dog or a man, and who fly from one, but not from the other. Hence, an emotion is in its origin partially subjective, relying for its existence upon our previous acquaintance with a given object, or with something which, either correctly or incorrectly, we classify therewith, and with its accompanying experiences of pleasure and pain. In all psychical states, indeed, from mere sensation to the complex sentiments on the one hand, and to abstract ideation on the other, there are always two factors clearly distinguished from one another—the objective and the subjective conditions prevalent at the time. An emotion has, indeed, been defined by Maudsley as the "sensibility of the supreme centres to ideas." The moral sentiment, therefore, is not an entity, but a relation between states of consciousness corresponding to a relation in external facts. The maintenance, among at least the higher animals, of such a relation we call morality, and those actions which tend to keep up that relation in its integrity are known as *good*; whilst those which tend to destroy it we call *bad*. Sometimes, by particularising a general term, equally applicable to good and bad actions, we speak of the former as exclusively moral; and, conversely, of the latter as immoral.

Morality came into being when, in the struggle for existence, there arose the need for mutual aid among members of the same species.

If we cut off one of the rays of a star-fish that ray will continue to move in certain directions; it will even turn over upon its ven-

tral surface when one lays it upon its dorsal. The leg of a spider detached from its body will likewise continue to move as though it were still part of the living animal. The eel will still wriggle when cut into pieces. There is a tendency in living matter for an act once performed to repeat itself: due, doubtless, to physico-chemical changes in the nature of the nerves along the line of such action rendering molecular motion along such line more easy than along others. Such action involuntarily performed is, when simple, termed *reflex*, and when complex is known as *habit*. That which we call conscience, enabling us to distinguish between right and wrong, is simply the recognition of similarity between acts we are now engaged in, and those which we are performing habitually. That this is so is proved by the fact that breaches of etiquette, however slight, are subject to the same "pricks of conscience" as lapses of morality; and also that, when any immoral action is persevered in and allowed to become habitual, conscience to that extent becomes inoperative or seared. Nor is it otherwise with the insane—that bugbear of the *a priori* philosopher. "A young man, having been arrested as a thief was sent to the reformatory at Saint-Urbain. One day he happened to lay his hands upon a snake which was hidden in a faggot of twigs. He became frightened, and, after his return to the reformatory, unconscious. Later, having become apparently permanently paralysed in his lower limbs, he was sent to the reformatory at Bonneval. Here, although his intellect remained unimpaired, a complete change of character took place, and he became scrupulously honest. Some months afterwards, however, he was seized with hysterical epilepsy; his former character reappeared, he became once more a thief and boasted loudly of his thefts. Having escaped with sixty francs, of which he had robbed an attendant, upon being recaptured he became so furious that it was necessary to confine him to a solitary cell."* Dr. Maudsley mentions three women of good social position but of hereditarily insane tendencies, who were addicted to the most terrible vices, performed with the utmost callousness.† Again, we have the fact that divergence from habitual thought or action is invariably accompanied by painful sensations. When we have once formed an opinion upon a subject we experience a severe "wrench" in giving it up and substituting another. It is this painful feeling—caused probably by lack of stimulus to nervous lines and centres, which thus, so to speak, come to suffer from starvation—when it accompanies acts called moral which we know as the reproof of conscience.

Frequently, indeed, there may be seen in conflict in the same individual two instincts—one an older and partially suppressed one, the other more recently induced. A somewhat amusing instance of this is given in the story of the two dogs who fought upon the jetty at Donaghadee, an Irish seaport village. During their battle both fell into the sea. One, a Newfoundland and an excellent swimmer, picked up its companion in distress and carried him safe to land. Shore reached, however, they once more commenced to fight in real earnest. Here we have two sentiments in operation, producing opposite effects, whose close juxtaposition makes them appear ludicrous. It is in the nature of the dog, as a carnivore of the wolf type, to fight, particularly with animals of a different species or even variety. All dogs are by nature land animals, but the Newfoundland variety has been artificially selected for the purpose of swimming, and of saving life from drowning. Whilst on land the natural habits of the animals prevailed: contact with the water, however, prompted the one to pursue his domesticated habit of saving life; an instinct which became inoperative upon his once more reaching land.‡ Such alternations of morality are not un-

* Ribot, *Diseases of Personality*, (English translation, Chicago: The Open Court Pub. Co., 1891) pp. 77-80.

† *Physiology and Pathology of Mind*, (London, 1868) pp. 358-360.

‡ An example of incipient alternation of character in a dog is quoted by Mr. Herbert Spencer in Appendix D of *Justice* (London, 1891, p. 230).

common among human beings. The Arab of the desert, in obedience to the laws of his religion, will entertain a stranger, but will not hesitate to pursue him after he has left his dwelling, rob and perhaps kill him. Here we have the hereditary predatory nature of the race conflicting with a superimposed religious law, which the Arab not only believes in, but acts up to! The Tasmanian women, whose maternal instinct was so strong that they adopted young dogs, tended and caressed them as though they were children, frequently killed their own infants at birth. If spared, the children were liable to be killed by the mother in time of war, or by the father in a fit of passion. Here again we have two moral sentiments: the one, the ever-present maternal instinct; the other, an hereditary tendency to acts rendered necessary by war or starvation. In our civilised societies the same fact is observable, more particularly in criminals and the insane. A wealthy man under certain conditions may steal. We say he suffers from kleptomania. Or a man, otherwise reputable, may inclose a piece of commons-land, adding little to the value of his own estate, but taking very much from the poor villagers. Here we have a temporary reversion to a type normal in many savage tribes, and developed to an alarming extent in that Indian robber-race, the Bhils. In King's Mill Isle, near Samoa, if a man, when out fishing, caught more than the others, his companions entered his canoe and helped themselves to what they would, and woe be to him if he resisted. In the Marquesas Islands, as we learn from M. Radiguet, a native does not hesitate to rob another of superfluous property, and, indeed, claims it as a right. Among lunatics, it has often been noticed that a period of gaiety, and, sometimes, of comparative sanity, and one of the most dangerous violence follow closely upon one another. Indeed Dr. Maudsley instances one case where, if apparent responsibility be the criterion of sanity, as lawyers claim, the patient could not have escaped punishment. Yet the man was hopelessly and dangerously insane, his disease passing at last into dementia. A young lady was "sincerely cheerful in her new relations when engaged in conversation, or in some occupation, but when she sat down to write home the old feeling returned and the old automatic morbid activity broke out." * In each case there existed an hereditary tendency to insanity, the family of the latter being "saturated" with it. In the ethics of trade this alternation of morality is a distinguishing feature. On the one hand we have exhibited that mercantilism which aims at amassing wealth by any means whatever, honorable or otherwise; whilst on the other hand there is a higher code, more worthy in its sentiments. The merchant or tradesman does not treat his family or his friends with that hollow sycophancy which he bestows upon his customers; nor would he deal differently between his children, as he often does with those who trade with him. In the morals of societies we may note the co-existence of a commercial with a warlike spirit in nations. At times the love of war, which comes down to us from savage ancestors, bursts forth with such force as totally to prostrate commerce. At other times so called "commercial expeditions" are sent out by civilised nations to Africa, Burmah, or Tonkin, in reality for marauding purposes, but nominally to spread civilisation among the savages—by the aid of the sword. These expeditions, we are informed, are intended to open up new channels of trade!

Through the foregoing psychological analysis we have arrived at certain fundamental general laws of morality. All morality is relative. Actions are influenced, not only by the physical and mental nature of the individual, and the accidents thereto, but also by the conditions under which he exists. To speak of Absolute Morality is but a contradiction in terms, and Mr. Spencer's phrase "absolute ethics" is little better. For, although by that term he does not mean to imply a non-relative morality, still, the inference that an ethic of *summum bonum* can exist without reference to the

conditions under which the acts were performed which it seeks to generalise, is a fallacious one. Mr. Spencer's term has as much intrinsic value as the mathematical x . Actions are called good or bad according as they are, or are not, habitual. Why certain acts should be habitual we shall see presently. And in this fact we may harmonise the hedonistic and opponent theories of philosophy. Whilst it must be admitted that good actions are accompanied by pleasurable feelings, and bad by feelings that are painful; it is equally true that there exist actions pre-eminently pleasurable which are nevertheless reckoned as serious offences. But, as we have observed, divergence from habit of thought or action is painful, whilst continuance therein is either positively or negatively pleasurable. Hence, although we must still look upon the accompanying pleasure or pain as a criterion of morality, it must be regarded as a secondary, not as the primary one.

Why have certain actions which we call good become habitual? For social life in all its forms there is necessary a certain amount of mutuality. Discord means the disruption of the society, and that may bring about death to all the individuals composing it. Where a tribe has to contend against numerous enemies division will be fatal. We see this well marked among the ants and bees. "One may cut an ant in two," says Huber, "by the middle of its body, without quelling its eagerness to defend its bearth and home. The head and thorax still march on, carrying the young one to a safe retreat." When an ant-colony is conquered by a foreign host one may observe several ants throw themselves into the midst of the invaders to save their young, even at the peril of their lives, while the rest of the tribe beat a hasty retreat. Nevertheless, a worker which, surrounded by its companions, will fight as bravely as any, will, Forel tells us, show itself extremely timid when alone, say at twenty yards from its nest. Among bees the strictest honesty prevails, as a rule, in dealing out the rations from the hive-cells. Still, there are some bees, as there are some men, greedy and thievish, who enter the cells by stealth to satisfy their gluttony. Turning to birds, Audubon relates the story of an attack by a serpent upon a nest of brown thrushes. The reptile was resisted by the male bird to the best of his ability; and the bird, having raised a cry of distress, was soon joined by another of the same species. A third afterwards came to the help of the others. Birds have sometimes been known to feed others blind or aged, even though of a different species. The thing is of frequent occurrence among birds of the same species. In their domestic morals birds are far superior to most of the lower animals, and, indeed, to many human beings and societies. Dr. Letourneau remarks that in the siege of Paris, in January, 1871, a German shell, bursting in the loft of the house of his friends, could not disturb a female pigeon sitting upon her nest.* So strongly attached are the couple to one another of the *Psittacus pertinax*, or Illinois parrot, that, when one dies, its mate scarcely survives a week. This bird exhibits—as likewise do the golden and bald-headed eagle—an almost perfect example of monogamous union, indissoluble and lasting throughout life. It is, however, only the marriage-tie which thus remains unbroken: the young, when old enough, are sent adrift—sometimes, indeed, forced out of the nest by their parents—and are no longer distinguished from mere strangers. Among birds, as among men, difference of surroundings may produce considerable moral differences. M. Montegazza has pointed out that, upon the shore of the lake of Guadalupe, replete with fish, the caimans have become mere inoffensive monsters, making no effort to attack human beings. But, elsewhere in South America the caiman is the most ferocious and most dangerous of beasts of prey.

A brief glance at the morals of animals higher in the scale must suffice. Our discussion is intended to be directed mainly towards the origin and evolution of human morals. It is noteworthy

* Maudsley *opus cit.* p. 381.

* *The Evolution of Marriage*, (Eng. trans., London, 1891) p. 29.

that even ferrets, as Dr. Romanes has observed, brought up under a hen, will not only not attack their adopted mother, but will hesitate whether or not to attack another hen, of which they have not the slightest knowledge. The association of ideas evidently, for a time at least, overrules their ancestral instinct. Dogs which have done wrong well know it, and hang down their tails or hide themselves in shame. A young elephant, whose mother had been shot, has been known, after spending the night with the corpse, to go on the morrow to the hunter, around whom he has entwined his trunk, seeking aid. On the other hand, the females of the rabbit kill and even devour their young; and among some of the anthropoid apes, the young, when old enough, rebel and assassinate their father and tyrant. Wild rabbits, unlike the domestic variety, will expose themselves and run the risk of being caught or killed, in order to save their young. A similar instinct has been observed by Brehm in baboons in Abyssinia. The family among the higher apes bears a close resemblance to that among the lowest men. In each the father is chief and despot, and the females of but secondary importance; in each the children have a place in the family only so long as they are young, and may, if not previously driven out of the horde, put one or both their parents to death, as do the chimpanzees and the Australians, as did the Fijians and Tasmanians. Indeed, Rousseau's pretty but wild theory to the contrary notwithstanding, all the facts go to show that the original form of human government was a despotic monarchy, bounded by the limits of the family or clan.

Morality is of two kinds: empirical and formal. By empirical morality we mean those moral actions which every individual performs in the ordinary course of life, first unconsciously, and afterwards more or less consciously. Formal morality is the morality of the schools, the ethical systems, codes and speculations which have from time to time been advanced.

The phenomena with which the science of ethics deals may be grouped under three heads. First, we have those reciprocal actions between individuals, which have little or no direct bearing upon the life of the society at large. In contradistinction to these, which we may call *private ethics*, there are a considerable number of actions which do concern public life, such as those in which individuals are concerned, not independently, but in their corporate capacity, as subjects, as citizens, and as public companies. This division may be known as *public ethics*. Between these two, and partaking of the nature of both, comes *domestic ethics*, dealing with the morals of the family relations. The first class includes, among others, beneficence, negative and positive, etiquette (so far as it may be subject of moral discourse), friendship and duty in general; the second, justice, State-duties and those of property in its various forms, political and trade morals; the third, chastity and filial and parental duties.

In constructing, however, a science of ethics based upon that of comparative ethnology, we must be exceedingly careful lest we brandish forth our own pre-judgments as actual facts. Many of the fallacies which have underlain ethical theories, are due to this cause. The theory that there are in the mind certain innate fundamental moral principles alike in every man is one of these fallacies, and one held even by so acute a thinker as the late Dean Mansel. The so-called "principles" of morality are after thoughts, are generalisations made by formal ethicists. Just as action precedes knowledge, so particular facts have an existence prior to systematised ethics, whose principles are but inductions from those facts. The savage does not consider whether it be right or wrong to steal or kill: he acts according to the conditions under which he is placed. Modesty is frequently spoken of as a fundamental virtue, more particularly in the female sex. Modesty is unknown among the animals, and is, we are told, a clear line of demarcation between them and men. But modesty is likewise unknown among primitive men. The Tasmanians had scarcely any idea of chastity,

and among them, as well as among the Australians, wives were frequently lent or hired out.* Among these peoples, those of New Caledonia and of the Andaman Isles, libertinism is an innocent amusement, even among children.† Among the Fijians, the Rev. Mr. Waterhouse, a Wesleyan missionary who had resided for some years in the Islands, tell us, "the precision with which words are employed to mark the various stages of immorality and sin is fearfully admonitory."‡ At Nouka Hiva, in the Pacific, the young girls make temporary marriages to procure them, for a time, riches. When they grow older, however, they make more lasting connections, and are said to be as firmly attached to their husbands as the majority of civilised women. In the Sandwich Isles, M. de Varigny informs us, the chief difficulty of the missionaries "consisted in teaching the women chastity; they were ignorant of the name and of the thing.§ An Aleut Eskimo told the missionary Langdorff that the sexual relations among his people were akin to those of the otters. Even among the Japanese, whose moral status can scarcely be regarded as inferior to that of the nations of the West, both sexes walk nude to and from the baths, and meet there indiscriminately without the sense of shame or any idea of indecency. Compare this with that exaggerated notion of modesty which made an ancient Greek declare of his hero that even in death in the midst of battle he fell with due decorum; which renders it necessary for an Arab woman to hide from the stranger more than half her face; and which in London, some years ago, forbade the mention in public of the name of a well-known politician and statesman which had been lately connected with a certain scandal. The origin of modesty is not difficult to arrive at. Among savages, as a rule, women are treated as goods and chattels, or at best as slaves. It was from their fear of their lord and master that the sense has been derived. The husband might kill, sell, give, or lend his wife, because she was his property; but woe be to the woman who did not consider herself as such and act accordingly

[TO BE CONCLUDED.]

CURRENT TOPICS.

Mr. Whitelaw Reid, while in the public service as Minister to France, learned the art of polite speech, and he finds it useful to him in his oratorical campaign. He scatters compliments around him with the graceful courtesy of a Frenchman, and he makes flattery look like genuine praise. At the Soldiers' Orphans' Home in Ohio, he raised all the inmates to the peerage as royally as if he held a sceptre in his hand. Throwing proper American contempt upon the titles conferred by foreign kings, he said: "We have no nobility in this country like that which exists in monarchies. There is no king or queen here to tap a man on the shoulder and make of him a knight, earl, marquis, or duke." This long felt want Mr. Reid himself supplied by ennobling all the children at the Home, and making them a brevet caste. Solemn as the Tycoon in the comic opera he proclaimed their elevation in these words: "Sons and daughters of the men who fought for the country in its hour of peril! You are our only nobility!" The modesty with which Mr. Reid, not having been a soldier, descends voluntarily to plebeian rank, is in the highest style of diplomatic art; for the flattery bestowed upon the children, glances from them to every member of the Grand Army, and titillates the vanity bump of every veteran who holds a ballot in his hand. I claim a ration of

* During the last century there are frequent records of sales by auction of wives in England. Indeed in 1837 a man in the West Riding of Yorkshire was sentenced to one month's hard labor for "attempting to sell his wife." In Yorkshire, too, a sale of a wife, in due legal form and attested by witnesses, took place even so late as in 1884.

† Letourneau. *Evolution de la morale* (Paris, 1887), p. 137; *Evolution of Marriage* (Eng. trans., London, 1891), pp. 57-58.

‡ *The King and People of Fiji*, p. 347.

§ *Quatorze Ans aux Iles Sandwich*, p. 159.

glory with the rest, and give thanks to Mr. Reid for lifting me into the ranks of the aristocracy; but before putting my vote in pledge, I wish to hear from Mr. Stevenson. It may be that he can compliment more eloquently than Mr. Reid, although as he has never been Minister to France the odds are all the other way. Still, Brutus having spoken, it is only fair to hear Antony. "Stay, ho! and let us hear Mark Antony."

When Mr. Whitelaw Reid told the children at the Soldiers' Home that they were "our only nobility," he showed himself wonderfully ignorant of the social progress made by his own countrymen while he was away in France. For instance, in the British peerage there are only about six hundred nobles altogether, while here we have them by the thousands. On the 15th of August, I quote from the newspapers, "Three thousand nobles with gleaming lances and brilliant apparel, on foot, in carriages, and bestride gaily caparisoned camels, wended their way through the oasis of Omaha." This was the grand parade of the Ancient Arabic Order of the Nobles of the Mystic Shrine, assembled in "conclave" at "the oasis of Omaha." These are all higher in rank than the English nobility; for, whereas, among the British peers, none but princes of the blood royal are called "illustrious," and none "imperial," every noble at Omaha was of "illustrious" degree; and there was a "Potentate" at the head of them, a dignitary not known in the House of Lords. All this appears from a record of the proceedings which informs us that "Illustrious Potentate Sam Briggs called the council to order, and Imperial Recorder Frank Luce called the roll." There is a harsh discord there, a familiarity out of harmony with the magniloquent style and splendor of nobility. I do not like to hear an illustrious potentate addressed by such a free and easy democratic title as Sam Briggs, as if he were no better than the rest of us. He ought to be Lord Samuel, or Sir Samuel, at the least, and I hope that he may be thus dignified at the next "conclave." He himself cared nothing about it, and he was far too proud and haughty to retaliate by calling the assembled peers Tom, Dick, and Harry, for he said; "Illustrious Associates, again I have the pleasure of greeting the Imperial body with the salutation ordained by the prophet, honored be his name." He then announced that the order contained within it 22,789 nobles, which is many more than can be found in Europe altogether. Here, then, is evidence that the soldiers and the sailors, and their children, are not what Mr. Reid affirms they are, "our only nobility."

As for knights, they are as common with us, as corn. We have them by the millions. In fact, nearly every other man in the United States is a knight of high or low degree. At the beginning of August the Knights Templar held their triennial "conclave" at Denver, and no less than twenty-five thousand of them were in the parade. I would give much to see an army of twenty-five thousand men marching in column, and every man a captain at the least, a knight, with the title "Sir" prefixed to his christian name. The effete monarchies cannot show anything like that. Although every man there was at least a knight, all the knights were not of equal rank; some were "Eminent," some "Very eminent," some "Right eminent," and others "Most eminent." There was a "Grand Prelate," and a "Grand High Priest," and a "Generalissimo," and a "Captain General," dwarfing the Right Hon. Earls and Barons of the old world to nothingness. What matters it that "we have no king or queen here to tap a man on the shoulder and make him a knight!" We can tap him on the shoulder and make him a knight ourselves. The Templars alone have enrolled amongst them half a million knights, and perhaps more, for the Pythians, a younger and less numerous fraternity, at their "conclave" just held at Kansas City, reported three hundred thousand Knights of Pythias in good standing. The favorite adjective by

which they describe their dignitaries is "Supreme," and this is a little higher than "Eminent." In addition to "Generals" by the cord, they have "Supreme" Chancellors, "Supreme" Keepers of the Exchequer, and many other "Supreme" officers, including one who is described in the papers as the "Supreme Ruler," not of the Universe, of course, but of the Order. There are other orders of knighthood and nobility scattered about the country, all of them helping to give to our society an aristocratic tone. Judging from the titles assumed by the Templars and the Knights of Pythias, I should think they ought to be "select" enough for anybody. But, no, even while I write the Order of Select Knights is holding a "conclave" at Dixon, Illinois. I do not think them very "select" for their dignitaries are only "Grand"; such as "Grand Commander," "Grand Standard Bearer," "Grand Senior Knight," "Grand Junior Knight," and so on. They are not even Illustrious, Eminent, or Supreme. All those orders have important magic revelations, phylacteries, and charms bidden in some tabernacle, or sanctum sanctorum, or secret cupboard of a mystic shrine. These mysteries are shown only to the initiated inside, because they cannot stand exposure to the air. If given to the light they would like ancient skeletons crumble into dust.

There is a good deal of human nature in mankind, and monkeys are not more alike than men. Even "organised labor," just like "organised capital," tries to hire its own workmen at the lowest rate of wages; but it surrenders more easily to a strike. The strike of the Buffalo switchmen failed, but the strike of the Chicago Musical Society against the Chicago Trades and Labor Assembly was a triumph. There is so much tragedy in the labor movement that we hail with gladness a shining ray of comedy here and there, for even Hamlet would be oppressive and dull without the flashes of humor that relieve the sombre play. There is no finer comic satire on the stage than the strike of the musicians against the attempt of the Trades and Labor Assembly to lower wages; and the moral of it, having the flavor of their own medicine, was too bitter for the Trades Assembly. The Chicago Musical Society is composed of "union" bands, mostly brass, and they refused to march and play in the great Labor Day procession for less than seven dollars a man, and this the Trades and Labor Assembly would not pay; whereupon a strike was ordered by the walking delegate, or some other competent authority of the Chicago Musical Union. The Trades and Labor men being employers this time, went out like other capitalists into the labor market, and made a contract with the Slavonian Musical Society for bands with just as much brass in them as the others, at the rate of only five dollars a day per man; and then came the inevitable boycott. The Slavonians were excommunicated as a "non-union" band, and a delegate from the Typographical Union threatened that if the Slavonian bands were employed the printers, and the painters, and the cigar-makers, and several other organisations would refuse to take part in the parade; but, in spite of the threat, the Assembly voted to ratify the contract made with the Slavonian Musical Society. They stood up like men for the right to hire whom they pleased, and they yielded the right like — men. In fact, they were in a false position, and there was nothing for them but surrender.

The strike of the musicians against the Trades and Labor Assembly was approved by Mr. Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor, who wrote a letter to the Assembly, lecturing that body as a schoolmaster would lecture a lot of unruly boys. Mr. Gompers is a very logical person, and he was astonished that a trades union confederation like the Chicago Assembly should be so illogical in employing labor as "to depart from union principles by refusing to pay union prices." He warned the assembly that its action "would put organised labor in a very pecu-

liar light, demanding high wages from employers and refusing the same to their fellow workers when in need of their services." The sarcasm is just, when tested by the principles of "organised labor," but it also shows that the ethics of organised labor in this particular is lopsided and unfair. It permits one set of workmen to practice extortion upon another, provided the extortion be called wages; but it does not allow the victims to say, "Our wages is diminished by the overcharge. Five dollars a day per man is the price of musicians for parade purposes, and if we are compelled to pay seven dollars a day, our wages is lowered in proportion to the size of the extortion, for we have no money but what we earn as wages." Mr. Gompers might reply to this, and still be logical, by saying, "You are organised to force up wages, and you should never complain that wages is too high. Were this extortion practised on marching clubs of Masons, or Odd Fellows, or party processions, you would all sustain the extortion, and contend that it was right. If it would be right for them it is right for you, and you may as well submit." I do not know that Mr. Gompers did actually talk that way but I think he must have done so, for the report of the last meeting says, "The assembly yielded every point, even to paying seven dollars a man on labor day." It also says that President Gompers was present "and his influence went a long way in the direction of harmony"; which reminds me of the gentleman who said, "Whenever my wife and I have any disagreement, I just let her have her own way at last; and she calls that a compromise."

M. M. TRUMBULL.

CORRESPONDENCE.

SOME FURTHER ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF NATIONALISM.

To the Editor of The Open Court :

Mr. Holland, in *The Open Courts* of July 7th, objects to further nationalisation because an increase of officers at the president's disposal would increase his power to buy re-election and pay for it with offices.

This trouble is easily avoided by adopting the one-term limit, and by the long-talked-of strict civil service laws, which further nationalisation will make imperative and which stagnation never will. Then if railroads and telegraphs were added to public service, only about one in seventeen voters would be employed by government. What could one voter do against the seventeen others more interested than before in good government?

The present partnership between all governments and corporations is acknowledged to be the chief source of corruption, corporations thus coming to own the most men and money; yet corporations are now an economic necessity until government shall perform their work.

But further on Mr. Holland says he does not object as much as I do to having men "strive physically, mentally, and morally." (I meant to say starve, but strive will do.) The struggle for existence of presidents is but a small part of the struggle, and the fact that men who do not object to the strife of "fair competition" do object to some features of political strife, shows that they have not perceived what the struggle for existence means. The fearful battle of the strong against the weak is everywhere, and stirs the souls of just people. Read the history of the Union and Central Pacific steals; Henry D. Lloyd's awful story of "The Strike of Millionaires Against Miners"; read that insult to the common people, "The Gospel of Wealth," by the arrogant Carnegie, self-appointed trustee for the ignorant community, and disciple of Spencer; read how Gould testified to paying \$1,000,000 in one year for Erie road legislation; and Helen Campbell's "Prisoners of Poverty," all examples of the inevitable results of competition.

Natural History must come before science. Agassiz felt unacquainted with jelly fish until he had studied the fish themselves two years. Those who talk of noble things coming naturally out of strife and starvation are like the Sunday school library books whose poor women, sick a year with a half-dozen babies around, were "neat and clean." Who washed their clothes? and where were they hung to dry? Physical starvation includes mental starvation. Philosophers talk of unfitness as Calvinists used to talk of infants' original sin, and the babies and the prisoners of poverty are too weak to protest that they are made largely by environments. Ignorance is dumb, and the learned who fall are soon too weak to be heard. The successful ones feel most like talking, and they scream everywhere. "The struggle is great fun! Honest merit wins! Hurrah for me!"

The competition recommended by theorists, practically the life and death struggle for the most or for a pittance, is most distasteful to refined people when seen as it really is, and it may sometime be as disgraceful as cock fighting.

ELLA ORMSBY.

"THE SURVIVAL OF THE UNFIT."

To the Editor of The Open Court :

Permit me to point out the contradiction in the phrase "The Survival of the Unfit."

The doctrine of the survival of the fittest, as it is called, is simply the statement that, under given conditions, that which exists does so because it is suited to those conditions. It precludes by the mere statement the very possibility of that which is "unfit" surviving.

Assuming the truth of the general statements that most people are wretchedly poor,—barely able to live,—that idiocy, insanity, intemperance, crimes of violence, and so on, are increasing faster than the whole population increases, what does this mean? Manifestly it means that present conditions are better suited to the survival of the ignorant, the coarse, the sensual, the dishonest, than to the survival of the intelligent, refined, honest, and sensitive. These brute masses whom you deplore need none of your sympathy; they are better fitted than your sensitive self to cope with the savagery around. The poor do not feel their degradation,—the tenement house people prefer dirt! Certainly they do; that is the reason they survive. The development of a preference for dirt is part of the adaptation which is going on.

I do not think that any legislation can reverse a tendency which counts our immense mass of legislation as part of the environment which has produced it: I am of the opinion that it is in the revocation of existing enactments that hope lies. To put it otherwise, I am of the opinion that the particular part of the environment which tends to throw men back into savagery, and to destroy association among them, lies, not in any necessary unsuitability of association to gratify men's desires, but in mistaken attempts to regulate association.

If Mrs. Bodington had seen, as I have seen, shiploads of fruit and vegetables thrown into the sea, because they were, forsooth, too plentiful, she would not take up with Malthusianism just yet awhile.

The trouble is mainly in two things. The first of these is the fact that the as yet unexhausted earth is inaccessible. The unoccupied land is held out of use, instead of being used to produce. It is held by people who do not want to use it, but only want to make others pay for the privilege.

It will not be changed until the intelligence of men, both poor and rich, grasps the fact that the land must be used, that possession must depend upon occupancy, under pain of a premature artificial land-scarcity such as prevails and from which we suffer.

The second cause is that after having produced men are not free to exchange. As all people who know anything know nowa-

days, to be able to trade off your stuff is perhaps less important as far as bare life goes, but even more important than production, if we are to enjoy life with comfort.

We cannot trade because the mechanism of exchange is antiquated and inefficient, and because mistaken laws prevent experiment and discovery of better methods. Gold and silver long ago were insufficient in quantity for use as a currency: private invention developed a wonderful system of banks. Now, gold and silver are too scarce even as security, yet arbitrary statute prevents the acceptance of other security even though entirely adequate.

Give us freedom of the land, freedom of the currency, and a few other freedoms that will easily come, and further progress in association will be possible. Otherwise, nothing but retrogression need be expected.

JOHN BEVERLEY ROBINSON.

BOOK REVIEWS.

A HISTORY OF PERU. By *Clements R. Markham*. Chicago: Charles H. Sergel & Co., 1892.

This is the first of a series of volumes in course of publication by Messrs. Sergel & Co., treating of the Latin-American republics. Perhaps, on the whole, no one could be found better fitted, so far as information is concerned, at least, than Mr. Markham for the performance of the task assigned to him. He has had intimate relations with Peru, and has studied its language and literature. Possibly for this very reason, however, the author's views are likely to be somewhat prejudiced in favor of the Peruvians, whose misfortunes appeal strongly to the feeling of those who sympathize with the unsuccessful defenders of their native soil against foreign aggression. Peru has been especially unfortunate in this respect. The conquest by the Spaniards, which resulted in the overthrow of the Inca empire, was followed by such a drain on the native population, consequent on forced labor, that in two hundred years it decreased nine-tenths in numbers. The rebellion in 1780 of Tupac Amaru, whose object was to get rid of the ordinances, the operation of which had caused so grievous a loss of life, led to the extirpation of the royal Inca family, under circumstances of the most heartless cruelty on the part of the Spaniards. And yet, strange to say, the very measures which the Peruvian patriot had proposed were soon after his death introduced by the new viceroy, Teodoro de Croix. From this period dates the beginning of what may be termed the modern history of Peru, for the incidents of which we must refer our readers to the work itself. Its author remarks, "The history of Peru is perhaps a sadder record than is met with in most nations, but it is full of stirring incidents, and affords much subject for thought." This is very true, and we do not think that Mr. Markham has done full justice to his theme. The book shows evidence of haste both in its preparation and in its passage through the press. As was probably to be expected, the chapters dealing with the people of Peru, its literature, and its wealth, are among the best. Those treating of the Inca civilisation contain but little new to the general reader, and we cannot accept as conclusive Dr. Brinton's statement, quoted with approval by the author, in connection with the question of the origin of the "red race," that "the culture of the American race is an indigenous growth, wholly self-developed, and owing none of its germs to any other race." Mr. Markham is more of a geographer than an anthropologist, although the map which forms the frontispiece of the work is valuable from both these points of view. The book is supplied with some good illustrations, and with an index in addition to a full table of contents, and it will probably at this period attract considerable attention. Ω.

NOTES.

In our following number the publication will begin of a series of articles by Mr. Charles S. Peirce on the methods of reasoning. (The first article of the series was announced for the present num-

ber.) It rarely occurs that the elements of a science are presented by those who have greatly contributed to its advancement. All students, therefore, should hasten to avail themselves of the opportunity to read what Mr. Peirce has to say concerning the fundamental principles of right reasoning.

The leading article of this week's *Open Court* deals with the question of Free Trade. Political questions are wholly subsidiary to the main work of *The Open Court*; and criticisms and letters touching this subject should be as brief as possible.

About a year ago Mr. M. D. Conway published an article in *The Open Court* regarding the authenticity of the Mecklenburg Declaration of Independence. A different view, that of its non-genuineness, is taken by Mr. W. H. Burr, of Washington. Readers interested in the subject should read the editorial on the question in the *New York Sun* of August 9th.

MR. C. S. PEIRCE has resumed his lessons by correspondence in the Art of Reasoning, taught in progressive exercises. A special course in logic has been prepared for correspondents interested in philosophy. Terms, \$30 for twenty-four lessons. Address: Mr. C. S. Peirce, "Avishe," Milford, Pa.

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CONTENTS OF NO. 262.

1776 AND 1892. F. M. HOLLAND.....	3367
EVOLUTIONARY ETHICS. THOMAS C. LAWS.....	3369
CURRENT TOPICS: Our Only Nobility. Our Many Nobilities. The Strike of the Musicians. GEN. M. M. TRUMBULL.....	3371
CORRESPONDENCE.	
Some Further Arguments in Favor of Nationalism. ELLA ORMSBY.....	3373
"The Survival of the Unfit." JOHN BEVERLY ROBINSON.	3373
BOOK REVIEWS.....	3374
NOTES.....	3374